The Problem of Democracy

Can Democracy Thrive in the Middle East?

Shadi Hamid
The Problem of Democracy: America, the Middle East, and the Rise and Fall of an Idea
Oxford: OUP, 2022.

Shadi Hamid is a columnist at The Washington Post, contributes to The Wisdom of Crowds substack, and research professor of Islamic Studies at Fuller Seminary.

The book is based on world-events, geo-political studies, interviews with officials in the Bush and Obama administrations, and Hamid’s own experience in the Middle East as a practicing Muslim. In many ways, it is a nakedly realistic perspective as to what is possible in terms of exporting liberal democracy into the Middle East - to be blunt, the answer is, not much!

Hamid points out the problems with promoting democracy in the Middle East. In sum, when free and fair elections take place in the Middle East, they normally result in the election of Islamicist governments, with Hamas in Gaza (2007) and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (2012) being cases in point. In the Middle East, democracy does not lead to a free and open society, rather, it leads to anti-Israel and anti-US foreign policies, sectarian divisions, and sometimes even illiberal Sharia law being implemented.

Instead of trying to impose democracy on nations that are religiously and ethno-tribally “complicated,” the US tends to back autocratic regimes which are liberal and cooperative in foreign policy, but repressive and undemocratic at home.

Hamid’s solution to this dilemma is what he calls "democratic minimalism" in which liberalism and democracy are decoupled and procedural democracy is the true objective. “If democracy is a form of government,” he infers that “liberalism is a form of governing,” a governing mode which is unworkable in the Middle East. He admits that democracy of some form is necessary to provide foundational legitimacy to a government; while the outcomes of an elected government need to be benevolent or benign rather than being entirely committed to political freedom. In other words, in the Middle East, democratic participation and processes can be exercised to an extent, an extent restricted by decidedly illiberal measures that guard against the sectarian extremism of Islamicist parties.

The reality is that liberal democracy is very much a western project - often capable of indigenous expression in places such as Kenya, Japan, Mexico, South Korea, and Argentina - but when exported, it is always complicated by religion, ethnicity, tribalism, history, geography, and economics. Liberal democracy “works” in the West due to our Greek, Roman, and Christian heritage, the movements of enlightenment and reformation, the separation of church and state, as well as an individualist rather than collectivist identity.

So, while human rights, “democracy sausages,” and a peaceful transfer of power might appear normal and even self-evident in Melbourne, Australia, it is either an impossibility or an absurdity in other parts of the world. For decades, the Soeharto regime in Indonesia practiced “guided democracy,” which was a democracy restricted by military supervision, the one-party rule of “Golkar” with a limited opposition, as well as being visibly Islamic, and Java-centric. Even Singapore, while clearly Democratic, is not as liberal as most western nations given its restrictions on drug use, no-tolerance policy on civil disorder, and a large emphasis on social harmony (including advice to tourists about “public displays of narcissism”).

I do wonder, as does Hamid, as to whether a reckoning or rapprochement with Islamicism is possible as part of a modus vivendi without the world entering into a hot or cold conflict of Islamic vs. Western civilizations. Can we avoid a situation where Islamic regimes will join an authoritarian axis comprised of fascist, marxist and ethno-nationalist autocracies who share a mutual animosity against the West? I find such a confrontation more likely than not as it seems to be the situation at the moment. But even then, it is not so clear. Qatar, which does lean in an Islamicist direction, has no intention of being an international pariah and can even mediate between the West and its more estranged Islamicized neighbors. But perhaps Qatar is pushing the limits as to what is possible. A clash of civilizations, where liberalism and democracy are either intrinsic or intrusive to a given civilization, is indeed more likely than not.

In the very least, Hamid challenges the notion that our national systems of liberal democracy are truly capable of universal hegemony. The European error has always been to assume that our national experiences must become universal and turned it into an ideological crusade to export it or impose it elsewhere, whether anti-monarchist revolution, liberal democracy, or rainbow flags and human rights. Alas, as Robespierre said, “Nobody likes armed missionaries!”

In any case, Hamid has written a fascinating book about democracy, liberalism, geo-politics, American foreign policy, how Islam is inextricably and inevitably political, and bluntly stated the possibilities and limits of liberal democracy in the Middle East.