Would a Western Intervention in Ukraine be a "Just War"?
Should the West intervene in Ukraine?
The prospect of American and European countries becoming involved in a military conflict in Ukraine is becoming more likely by the day. So what are the conditions that would precipitate or perhaps even necessitate a Western military intervention in Ukraine? When is not getting involved worse than getting involved? Would it be the right thing to do?
Of course, if we are talking about triggers, decision points, and casus belli for a direct military conflict between NATO and Russia there is an elephant in the room we must address.
There is the problem of the “red line bluff.” The US and Europe (i.e., NATO) could declare there is a red-line that, if crossed, would cause them to intervene militarily. That could include the use of chemical, thermobaric, and nuclear weapons, the massing of Russian forces on the western side of the Dnieper river, invading Moldova, or even attacking targets on the Polish border which is the conduit for western supplies into Ukraine.
There are problems with drawing a red line.
First, it’s been done before and it did not work. Remember when President Obama warned Putin and Assad that using chemical weapons in Syria would cross a “red line” and there would be consequences. Well, they crossed the line by using chlorine bombs, and there were no direct military consequences. Bluff called and Obama did next to nothing. Whether Obama was right or wrong not to intervene in Syria is another matter. But it made America look weak, just as America’s shambolic evacuation of Kabul did this year.
And that is why Putin has never met a red-line he is not willing to cross. He believes that when it comes to throwing down, America will most likely walk away. Also, even if you do follow through with your punitive threat, Putin will extend the theatre of war and escalate the type of warfare being conducted. Putin knows that the West does not want that.
Second, one must accept, as Obama knew, that Ukraine matters more to Russia than it does to Western Europe. Ukraine has, since the eighteenth century, mostly been under the hegemony of Russia, with parts at different times also controlled by the Polish-Lithuania empire, Habsburgs, and Ottomans. Don’t get me wrong, there is a distinct Ukrainian identity and culture, and a nationalist movement going back to 1900. But for the last 250 years, Ukraine has been Russia’s buffer between Europe and Turkey, as well as Russia’s breadbasket. Kyiv is the birthplace of the Russian people and Crimea is the spiritual birthplace of Russian Orthodoxy. We have to accept that, whatever our commitments to liberal democracies in the world, Russia has more history as a hegemon over Ukraine and it consequently has more skin in this “game.”
This means that Putin wants Ukraine more than the West does and he’s willing to inflict and endure a lot of suffering to get it.
Even so, what Putin precisely wants and what he can actually achieve is not all that clear.
It was the ousting of the pro-Russian government in 2014 and its replacement by a democratic and pro-western government that really precipitated Russia’s invasion of parts of Ukraine in 2014. The concern for Russian-speaking majorities in some southern and eastern districts of Ukraine was an unresolved issue from the Soviet Union’s sudden collapse which then became the casus belli for the annexation of Crimea and the invasion of the Donbas. Otherwise, in terms of strategic goals, it appears that:
Putin wants Russia to be, again, a major player in international geopolitics.
Putin does not want NATO on his doorstep nor a liberal democratic neighbour.
Putin has spoken in terms akin to annexing Ukraine, arguing that Russia and Ukraine are one people, and Ukrainianism is not a real thing.
It is possible too that Putin wants to federalize Ukraine, turn Ukraine into a series of small provinces with only a very loose federal unity, where each province can determine its own relationship to Russia.
Putin may have thought that he’d be able to seize Kyiv and eastern Ukraine in a week or so, install his own government, and then either annex or federalize Ukraine. That obviously hasn’t happened and probably won’t happen. What Putin may be able to achieve at the moment is exert enough pressure to get recognition for the annexation of Crimea and the independence of the Donbas region, an agreement for Ukraine to never join NATO, and limitations on the size of Ukraine’s military.
Given all that, there is a real red line, one that matters, one that would have to be acted upon if crossed. And that would be a direct Russian attack against a NATO member. An attack on one NATO member is an attack on all of them, so NATO would have to respond.
But, besides defending NATO countries from Russia, are there just grounds for a NATO intervention in Ukraine now?
If you consider the normal criteria for a “just war” the results are rather mixed.